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Cite as: Matthew M. Pagett, Taking Note: On Copyrighting Students’ 
Lecture Notes, 19 RICH. J. L. & TECH 6 (2013), available at 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i2/article6.pdf. 
 
An essential element of individual property is the legal 
right to exclude others from enjoying it.  If the property is 
private, the right of exclusion may be absolute; if the 
property is affected with a public interest, the right of 
exclusion is qualified.  But the fact that a product of the 
mind has cost its producer money and labor, and has a 
value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to 
ensure to it this legal attribute of property.  The general 
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as 
the air to common use.  Upon these incorporeal 
productions the attribute of property is continued after such 
communication only in certain classes of cases where 
public policy has seemed to demand it.  These exceptions 
are confined to productions which, in some degree, involve 
creations, invention, or discovery.1 
 
– Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
                                                
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Judge Linda Stephens, North Carolina Court of 
Appeals.  J.D., Wake Forest University School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.  
 
1 Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] According to The Orion, “an independent, student-run newspaper 
at California State University, Chico” (“CSU”),2 two students at CSU 
were reported to their school’s Judicial Affairs office on November 16, 
2011, for selling class notes from a lecture through the online note-selling 
service, Notehall.com.3  Notehall.com solicited the students, including Ms. 
Kelsey Goishi, a junior majoring in communications studies, through the 
university’s e-mail client.4  Through that medium, the service offered the 
students semester-long positions as professional note-takers, which could 
garner each student up to $450 per semester.5  In order to fulfill their 
duties for this position, Ms. Goishi and the student-employees were 
required to upload weekly lecture notes and, more importantly, “study 
guides,” which contained “explanations of all the information that [the 
students would] be tested on.” 6  
 
[2] After performing these tasks, the student-employees were expected 
to inform their classmates about the study guides by sending out a class-
wide e-mail.7  Ms. Goishi’s professor was “made aware” of the study 
guide for his class, which was then on sale for $5, after a student sent out 
                                                
2 About the Orion, THE ORION, http://theorion.com/site/about/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2012).  
 
3 Molly Rose Livingston & Ashley Nakano, Notehall Allows Students to Commit 
Academic Dishonesty, THE ORION (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://theorion.com/features/article_4d317be4-1a47-11e1-a2e4-001a4bcf6878.html.  
 
4 Id. 
 
5 Id.  The e-mail itself reportedly proclaimed: “Being a Note-Taker means making money 
just being a good student!”  Id. 
 
6 Id. 
 
7 Id. 
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such an e-mail.  Afterward, Ms. Goishi was required to meet with both the 
office for Judicial Affairs and her instructor.8  Though the personal 
consequences of this meeting for Ms. Goishi are unknown,9 CSU sent 
Notehall.com a cease-and-desist letter a few months after the incident, 
citing both state law and university policy forbidding the sale, distribution, 
and publication of class notes for commercial purposes.10  As a result, 
Notehall.com no longer allows students from CSU or other University of 
California campuses to upload notes through their system.11  Interestingly, 
however, the company never acknowledged the validity of CSU’s legal 
claim, simply noting that it was refusing service to these schools “[o]ut of 
respect for this policy.”12 
 
[3] While it has been asserted that Ms. Goishi’s actions and the 
Notehall.com procedures for selling notes are a “clear violation” of 
                                                
8 Livingston & Nakano, supra note 3. 
 
9 Id. 
 
10 See Erica Perez, Colleges Crack Down on Selling, Sharing Notes, CALIF. WATCH (Feb. 
3, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/colleges-crack-down-selling-sharing-
notes-14744.  
 
11 Id.  When a student attempts to upload notes from CSU or a school associated with the 
University of California, they are met with the following error message (or one like it): 
 
Unfortunately, No More Notes! . . . The California State University 
Student Conduct Code prohibits students from selling class notes, and 
subjects violators to potential disciplinary actions. Out of respect for 
this policy, Notehall does not offer its note taking services at your 
school.  We apologize for the inconvenience, and share your 
disappointment with this CSU policy decision.  
 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 
12 Id. 
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California state law and broadly speaking, “illegal,”13 the extent to which 
this may be true and the circumstances under which either California law 
or U.S. copyright law may be violated is unclear.  This article will review 
the relevant law on the question of whether a student owns the copyright 
in her or his own notes and attempt to answer that question.  Part II 
addresses: (1) the primary elements of a copyrightable work under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, (2) the Fair Use Doctrine, (3) whether classroom 
notes constitute protected compilations, and (4) whether classroom notes 
could be considered “derivative works.”  Part III discusses the federal 
preemption doctrine, whether states have the authority to legislate 
ownership of copyrighted works, and, if so, the effect of that authority, 
with special emphasis on California law.  In Part IV, this article will 
address the particular factual circumstances discussed in Part I and 
evaluate whether Ms. Goishi and Notehall.com were in “clear violation” 
of state or federal law.  Lastly, the author will postulate as to the certain 
circumstances that may or may not create a copyright or allow for the 
infringement of that right with regard to students’ lecture notes.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Fixation and Originality Under the Copyright Act of 1976 
 
[4] Congress’s authority to protect individuals’ intellectual property 
comes from the United States Constitution, which states that “Congress 
shall have the Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 14   The statute 
                                                
13 Livingston & Nakano, supra note 3.  
 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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currently exercising this Congressional power is the Copyright Act of 
1976 (“the Act”).15  
 
[5] In pertinent part, the Act states that copyright protection is granted 
to “original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression,” including, but not limited to: (1) literary works; (2) musical 
works; (3) dramatic works; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.16  A 
                                                
15 David Mirchin & William S. Strong, Copyright Law, in MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUCATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRACTICE § 7.1.8 (Jerry Cohen ed., 2011) 
(“The first statute to provide copyright protection, enacted in 1790, protected only maps, 
charts, and books.  The Copyright Act of 1909 broadened available copyright 
protection.  This act was replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976, which took effect on 
January 1, 1978, and . . . is the current copyright law.”). 
  
16 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  It should be noted that academic 
“lectures” are not included in the list of possibly copyrightable material.  This omission is 
not sufficient to defeat a professor’s claim of copyright, however, as the statutory list is 
only inclusive, not exclusive, merely providing examples of likely copyrightable 
works.  The idea that lecture notes may fall within the realm of copyrightable subject 
matter is bolstered by the fact that lecture notes are neither explicitly excluded by the 
administering agency as among those materials not covered by the Copyright Act.  Such 
excluded works include:  
 
(a) words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans . . . (b) 
[i]deas plans, methods, systems, or devices . . . (c) [b]lank forms, such 
as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, 
scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms and the like . . . 
(d) [w]orks consisting entirely of information that is common property 
containing no original authorship, such as, for example: Standard 
calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers, 
schedules of sporting events, and lists or tables taken from public 
documents or other common sources. 
 
Material Not Subject to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2012); see also Stephanie L. 
Seeley, Are Classroom Lectures Protected by Copyright Laws? The Case for Professors’ 
Intellectual Property Rights, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 163, 171 (2001) (“It seems 
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work of originality is considered “fixed” when it is written down or 
captured in such a way that it becomes “sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”17  
 
[6] With regard to academia, the fixation language has been 
interpreted to exclude material presented orally in courses.18  In Fritz v. 
Arthur D. Little, Inc., the plaintiff taught leadership training seminars and 
sued the defendant for stealing his trade secrets by taking “copious notes” 
during those seminars. 19   The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
copyright claim, however, reasoning that that “[o]riginal words spoken 
aloud can be copied (and independently copyrighted) by all, if they have 
not previously been fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”20  Pulling 
from Justice Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., the Court relied on the aphorism that “[o]thers are free to copy the 
original[, but t]hey are not free to copy the copy.”21 
 
[7] Under that rationale, the question of “fixation” is brought to the 
forefront when considering whether a professor’s lecture may be subject to 
copyright protection.  Pursuant to the language in Fritz, a professor or 
                                                                                                                     
contradictory to deny professors copyright protection in their expression of ideas 
conveyed through a lecture since ‘the requirements for copyright protection are 
minimal . . . .’”).  
 
17 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 
18 Fritz v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 95, 100 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 
19 Id. at 96, 100-01 (determining that “there is not a strong likelihood that plaintiffs will 
succeed on the merits of their copyright infringement claims”).  
 
20 Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
 
21 Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 2 
 
 
7 
 
university must be able to show that the students’ notes were not copies of 
an original, extemporaneous expression in order to have a valid copyright 
claim; rather she, he, or it must show that the notes were copies of 
methodically planned, outlined, and notated predeterminations.  Thus, 
when evaluating whether a professor’s lecture is “fixed,” you must first 
ask whether the students’ notes are copies of an original, spontaneous 
statement on the part of the professor or whether the students’ notes are 
copies of the professor’s “copy,” i.e., her or his uniquely prepared 
presentation of original material.22 
 
[8] This question speaks to the other major requirement for a work to 
be considered copyrightable under the Act, whether the presumptively 
copyrighted work is “original.”23  A prospective plaintiff can generally 
meet the originality requirement with little effort, simply showing that the 
work “possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or 
obvious’ it might be.”24  Because a professor is likely to organize his or 
her lecture with some modicum of creativity and thoughtfulness,25 such a 
presentation would probably satisfy the originality requirement.26 
                                                
22 Fritz, 944 F. Supp. at 99.  It may be that this question can only be properly answered 
after an extensive factual inquiry to determine exactly which parts of a professor’s lecture 
are unique and spontaneous representations, which parts were pre-prepared presentations, 
and, concurrently, which parts of the students’ notes come from which parts of the 
professor’s lecture. See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50 (referring to the process 
of “copy[ing] a copy” versus “copy[ing] an original,” and noting that “the [first] copy is 
the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. . . . [p]ersonality always contains 
something unique. . . . [i]t expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very 
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone”).  
 
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 
24 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (noting that 
“[o]riginality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying”). 
 
25 Preparing to Teach the Large Lecture Course, UNIV. OF ARK. WALLY CORDES 
TEACHING AND FACULTY SUPPORT CTR., http://tfsc.uark.edu/118.php (“Organize the 
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[9] In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a proper claim of copyright 
infringement, one must prove: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) 
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”27  To 
establish ownership of a valid copyright, the plaintiff must show both 
fixation and originality under the terms of the Act.28  In addition, the work 
must be of a sort that is qualified to be considered for copyright 
protection.29  While lectures are not explicitly protected under the Act, 
they are neither explicitly denied such protection.  Under the standard 
discussed in this article, it seems likely that such expressions would meet 
the originality requirement.30  There is a question, however, as to whether 
                                                                                                                     
topics in a meaningful sequence.  Lurching from one topic to another makes it difficult 
for students to assimilate and retain the material . . . Arrange the course topics 
thematically, chronologically spatially, in ascending or descending order, by cause and 
effect or problem and solution, or according to some other conceptual rationale.”); see 
BARBARA GROSS DAVIS, TOOLS FOR TEACHING 137 (2d ed., 2009) (explaining the 
importance of lecture organization). 
 
26 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“[I]t is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within 
the subject matter of copyright.”).  Interestingly, while the originality with which a 
professor organizes her or his lecture speaks to the copyrightability of a certain lecture, 
the ingenuity and originality with which a student takes his or her notes also speaks to the 
extent to which the student notes are a separate, unique creation—and not just a copy—
warranting copyright protection in and of themselves.  
 
27 Id. at 361.  
 
28 See id. at 355 (“The two fundamental criteria of copyright protection are originality and 
fixation in tangible form.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976)).  
 
29 See generally supra note 16; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
 
30 It is helpful when thinking about whether a lecture should be considered a work subject 
to the Act to look to the “Idea/Expression” doctrine.  This principle declares that only an 
individual’s particular “expression” of an idea is protected by copyright law, not the idea 
itself.  Thus, the way in which a professor presented his material would be more relevant 
for purposes of the Act than the mere fact that he presented the material at all.  See Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[Copyright law] distinguishes between ideas and 
expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection.”).  
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a lecture presented vocally and without visual aids is “fixed in a tangible 
medium” for the purposes of Section 102.  While there seems to be 
support for the idea that fixity could occur given sufficient preparation on 
the professor’s part, it is unclear without delving more fully into the facts 
of a particular case.31 
 
B.  The Fair Use Doctrine 
 
[10] When a work is protected under the Act, use may be immune from 
an action of copyright infringement on the grounds that it is a “fair use” of 
the author’s protected expression.32  The fair use exception is codified in 
Section 107 of the Act and states that the reproduction of a copyrighted 
work “for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is 
not an infringement of copyright.”33  In determining whether the fair use 
doctrine applies to any one particular situation, the statute directs courts to 
consider the following factors: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
                                                
31 Parts of a lecture that are specifically planned out by a professor may be more likely to 
be considered “fixed.”  Any part of a lecture that it could be reproduced would likely 
meet the fixation requirement (e.g., PowerPoint presentations, sound recordings, and 
outlines created by the professor and then published to the class).  
 
32 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Unlike the reactionary defenses discussed in the section above (e.g., 
lack of originality, etc.), the fair use doctrine is an affirmative defense to a claim of 
copyright infringement.  Id.  
 
33 Id. (emphasis added). 
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effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.34 
 
[11] The fair use doctrine has been referred to as “the most important 
defense to infringement,”35 and the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
doctrine to “permit[] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright 
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which the law 
is designed to foster.”36  While there is an argument to be made that the 
use and sale of a student’s lectures notes constitutes a “fair use,” many 
factors weigh against such a defense.37  
 
[12] The first factor, “purpose and character,” turns on whether the use 
is “of a commercial nature.”38  If the use is of a commercial nature, less 
weight is typically given to the argument that the use is acceptable under 
the fair use defense.39  Even if a court determines that a particular use is 
“of a commercial nature,” however, such a determination does not fully 
                                                
34 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
35 Mirchin & Strong, supra note 15, § 7.11.1.  
 
36 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research 
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).  
 
37 But see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(noting that “the single most important element of fair use” is the factor concerning the 
“Effect on the Market”).  If a court were to rely most heavily on the market-effect factor, 
it might find that the commercial sale of student notes does fall within the fair use 
exception, largely because the professor and university would likely continue to generate 
the same level of revenue despite the proliferation of the professor’s lecture notes among 
his or her students.  This rationale is discussed in more detail in paragraphs 15-17, infra.  
 
38 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 
39 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67 (quoting M. Nimmer, Copyright §1.10[D] 1-87 (1st 
ed. 1984)). 
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exclude the possibility of utilizing the fair use defense.40  For instance, in 
Ms. Goishi’s situation—where she and other student-employees sold their 
notes for a moderate profit—a court might find that the other three factors 
taken together weigh more heavily in favor of a finding that, despite its 
commercial nature, the sale of the students’ notes was a “fair use.”  
 
[13] It is unclear whether the second fair-use factor, “the nature of the 
copyrighted work,” would lend itself, along with the other factors, to a 
finding that a student’s notes are a “fair use” of a professor’s lecture.  The 
second factor is broad, but it has been interpreted in such a way that those 
works which are “intended” to have more copyright protection receive it.41  
Thus, under the intention standard, works that are original (as opposed to 
derivative), creative (as opposed to factual), and unpublished (as opposed 
to published) are generally considered to “merit greater protection.”42  
Such factors cut in favor of and against a student-employee who is 
working for an organization like Notehall.com.  On one hand, the 
“unpublished”43 nature of the transcribed lecture notes44 is often a factor 
                                                
40 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“In giving virtually 
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals 
erred.  The language of the statute makes it clear that the commercial or nonprofit 
education purpose of a work is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its 
purpose and character.”) (emphasis added).  
 
41 Id. at 586. 
 
42 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 
1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a church organization’s dissemination of a 
book on sales techniques to train its members for positions within the church constituted 
a fair use of the book).  
 
43 17 U.S.C. § 107.  In this scenario, another interesting factual question that may need to 
be asked is not whether the actual lecture is unpublished (as most lectures are), but 
whether the lecture’s content has previously been published.  A particular lecture’s class 
material might be more protected if the professor were to discuss a topic about which she 
or he intends (or has begun) to publish, but has not yet disseminated.  
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weighing against a finding of fair use.45  On the other, classroom lectures 
typically constitute a mix of factors, including (a) originality, (b) 
derivation, (c) creativity, and (d) basis in fact.  While factors (a) and (c) 
generally weigh against a finding of fair use, factors (b) and (d) typically 
weigh in favor of such a finding.  Thus, such a mixture of factors would 
likely obfuscate the application of a clear precedential rule as to whether 
the “nature” of a classroom lecture protects that lecture against the 
affirmative defense of “fair use.” 
 
[14] The third factor asks for the relative “amount and substantiality of 
the portion used” in the class notes when compared with the lecture as a 
whole.46  Generally speaking, “[t]he more has been taken, the harder it is 
to justify as fair use . . . [because] fair use should as a rule take no more 
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of the user.”47  In this 
case, the students working for Notehall.com were expected to upload class 
notes at least once a week and to create a study guide for their class’s 
exam.48  Thus, it was necessary for them to “take” something constituting 
almost the entirety of the lecture, at least with regard to substantive 
                                                                                                                     
44 It is presumed the copying of the lecture notes is sufficiently fixed to bestow copyright 
protection.  Whether a particular student copies down a professor’s lecture word-for-word 
or merely takes notes on the general topics discussed is likely to play an important role in 
any such copyright infringement case.  
 
45 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985) (“The 
obvious benefit to author and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop their 
ideas from fear of expropriation outweighs any short-term ‘news value’ to be gained from 
premature publication of the author’s expression.”).  Under that standard, a professor’s 
lecture may be more likely to survive a fair use defense when it includes information that 
the professor intends to publish at a later date to the larger academic community (e.g., a 
study or project on which the professor is currently working).  
 
46 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 
47 Mirchin & Strong, supra note 15, § 7.11.1(j). 
 
48 See Livingston & Nakano, supra note 3.  
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content.  There may be a question as to whether a student truly “takes” the 
professor’s lecture when she or he takes that information and processes it 
in a new form; if one assumes that a lecture is copyrighted in the first 
place, however, fair use is probably less likely to succeed as an affirmative 
defense to copying and selling the lecture notes.   
 
[15] The last factor that courts measure when determining whether the 
fair use defense is applicable is “the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”49  While each factor is 
typically given equal weight today,50 the fourth factor was at one time 
considered the predominate factor in any court’s consideration.51  As a 
part of that consideration, the operative question for any court is: “Does 
the use reduce the money the copyright holder has received for the work 
or is likely to receive from the work?”52  If so, then the fair use defense is 
unlikely to succeed.53 
  
[16] At first blush, it would seem that this factor, which was once 
considered the most important of the four, cuts in favor of a student-
employee who sells her class notes online.  While the availability of class 
notes might affect the overall “grading curve” of a course, that availability 
                                                
49 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 
50 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“All [four 
statutory factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright.”) (citing William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use 
Misconstrued: Profit Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 
685-87 (1993)).   
 
51 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 602 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 
52 Mirchin & Strong, supra note 15, § 7.11.1(k).  
 
53 Id. 
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is narrowly tailored for the purpose of helping those students who are 
enrolled in a certain course.  The notes are rarely seen by individuals other 
than the students themselves and are not necessarily valuable beyond the 
life of the course.  Taken in that light, the negative economic effect on 
either the professor or the university would seem to be slight, bolstering 
the idea that a student-defendant might be able to utilize the fair use 
defense after all. 
 
[17] Such a reading of the Act fails to consider how a professor might 
use his or her lecture material outside of class, however.  It may be 
inferred from the language of the Act that the value of the fourth factor 
turns on whether the professor’s work is “unpublished.”54  Thus, if a 
professor discusses a topic about which she or he intends to publish, and 
her or his theories and conclusions are “leaked” to the public before they 
are fully prepared for publication, there may yet be some negative 
economic effect for the professor.  The extent to which such a leak would 
be damaging is unclear, however.  Because commercial note-sharing 
services are typically oriented toward a specific audience and used for a 
specific purpose (i.e., students seeking to gain a degree), it seems unlikely 
that a leak would cause more damage to the lecturer than that person’s 
practice of discussing her or his theories and conclusions during a 
classroom lecture already does.  
 
[18] Thus, while certain “fair use” factors may cut in favor of the idea 
that a student-employee and note-taker might be able to assert the fair use 
defense, the greater weight of the evidence would seem to support the idea 
that a professor’s lecture, if copyrightable, could withstand such an 
assertion. 
  
 
                                                
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding 
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”). 
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C.  Compilations and Derivative Works 
 
[19] When evaluating factual scenarios like those surrounding class 
lectures, it is also important to determine whether the lecture itself, the 
resulting student notes, or a portion of those notes, could be protected as 
compilations or derivative works.55  Section 101 of the Act defines a 
protected “compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and 
assembling of preexisting materials . . . that are selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
original work of authorship.”56  The same section defines a “derivative 
work” as: 
 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as . . . any . . . form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting 
of . . . elaborations[] or other modifications which, as a 
whole, represent an original work of authorship . . . .57 
 
It is important to note that, for both definitions, the language of the Act 
focuses on the fact that such works must be so different from preexisting 
works that they constitute an “original work of authorship.” 58   A 
compilation sufficient to be considered an original work of authorship is 
created when the preexisting works are selected and arranged in an 
original way.59  For derivative works, this happens when the preexisting 
                                                
55 See id. at § 103(b) (noting that “derivative works” and compilations are encompassed 
within the penumbra of copyrighted works, but only regarding “the material contributed 
by the author of such work[s], as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in 
the work”). 
 
56 Id. at § 101 (emphasis added). 
 
57 Id. (emphasis added).  
 
58 See id.  
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work is “recast, transformed, or adapted” in such a way that the derivation 
becomes an original work in and of itself.60  
 
1.  Compilations 
 
[20] Little case law exists on the narrow issue of whether a student’s 
class notes or a professor’s lectures constitutes a protected 
compilation.  Generally speaking, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has stated that, while “facts are not copyrightable[,] compilations of facts 
generally are.”61  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service 
Company, Inc., the Court addressed whether a telephone utility’s listing of 
names, towns, and telephone numbers was copyrightable.62  Noting that 
the listings “could not be more obvious,” the Court determined that they 
were not sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.63  The Court 
reasoned that, in order for a compilation of facts to be sufficiently original 
to merit copyright protection, it must be “selected, coordinated, or 
arranged” in an original way.64  Thus, because the telephone utility’s 
                                                                                                                     
59 See id. 
 
60 Id. 
 
61 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45, 348 (1991) 
(distinguishing between “nothing but raw data—i.e., wholly factual information not 
accompanied by an original written expression,” which is not copyrightable, and works 
“possess[ing] some minimal degree of creativity,” which are protected by copyright law).  
 
62 See id. at 342-44. 
 
63 Id. at 362-63 (“We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by 
Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in 
Rural’s combined white and yellow pages directory.”).  
 
64 See id. at 358 (“The key to the statutory definition is the second requirement. It 
instructs courts that, in determining whether a fact-based work is an original work of 
authorship, they should focus on the manner in which the collected works have been 
‘selected, coordinated, and arranged.’”). 
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listing was “entirely typical” and “devoid of even the slightest trace of 
creativity,” lacking “more than a de minimis quantum of creativity,” it was 
not copyrightable.65 
 
[21] Although the Supreme Court has not answered the question of 
whether a student’s lecture notes constitute a copyrightable compilation, 
one federal district court has held that a professor’s pre-prepared practice 
questions were copyrighted works.66  Because a compilation must be the 
result of an original selection, coordination, or arrangement of facts,67 the 
contents of an in-class lecture could reasonably meet the criteria for this 
standard as long as the fixation requirements are met. 68   If those 
requirements are not met, and a professor’s lecture is not considered a 
copyrightable work, it is still possible that a student’s own class notes, 
capturing that work, could constitute a protected compilation.  
 
[22] To address that question, it is helpful to look at the statutory 
language, discussed at length in Feist, which requires the selection, 
coordination, or arrangement of facts in an original way.69  That mandate 
strikes at the very heart of this article.  While “facts are never original,” in 
and of themselves, they can become so when they are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in an original way.70  With regard to student 
                                                
65 Id. at 362-63.  
 
66 See Faulkner Press, L.L.C. v. Class Notes, L.L.C., 756 F. Supp. 2d. 1352, 1360 (N.D. 
Fla. 2010).  
 
67 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 360. 
 
68 The practice questions had previously been written down in the professor’s textbook, 
helping meet the fixation requirement.  See Faulkner Press, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1356. 
 
69 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358. 
 
70 See id. (“Facts are never original, so the compilation author can claim originality, if at 
all, only in the way the facts are presented.”).  
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notes, it is important to consider the fact that the Feist standard does not 
require a piece be original in its selection, coordination, and 
arrangement.71  Rather, originality is required in only one of these areas.72  
Thus, it is likely difficult, though not impossible, for a student to show that 
the contents of her class notes are the result of originality in their selection 
and organization (as they are likely the result of the professor’s selections, 
not the student’s). However, that student may be able to argue that she has 
arranged the professor’s lecture in a way that is sufficiently original to 
warrant copyright protection.  In addition, a student who supplements her 
professor’s lecture notes with her own notes (taken from her independent 
research, for example), could probably show original selection as 
well.  Her success would depend, in large part, on the particular factual 
circumstances surrounding her notes and how those notes were created 
and amended during the studying process.  Such an showing is discussed 
in greater detail infra Part V.  
 
2.  Derivative Works 
 
[23] If a professor’s lecture is able to qualify for copyright protection, it 
is also possible that a student’s notes, which are based on that lecture, 
could be considered a copyrightable derivative work of the professor’s 
lecture.  In such a case, a student would have to show that his or her class 
notes have “recast, adapted, or transformed” the professor’s lecture in an 
original way73 and, further, that the professor or the institution (i.e., the 
                                                
71 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the 
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
original work of authorship. The term ‘compilation’ includes collective works.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 
72 See Faulkner Press, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. 
 
73 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103.  
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copyright holder) gave the student permission to prepare such a work.74  
While it has been argued that students’ class notes cannot be considered 
protected compilations or derivative works “because the student is not 
adding any creativity to the process,” that argument is premised on the 
idea that “[it is] the student’s job is to take down the professor’s words, 
exactly from the lecture itself.”75  
 
[24] When determining whether a student might own the copyright in 
his or her class notes, as a derivative work, the first question is whether the 
student has the permission of the copyright holder, either the professor or 
the institution, to make the derivative work.76  Section 106(2) of the Act 
confers on the author of an original work the right to “prepare derivative 
works” and Section 103(a) further notes that unlawfully procured 
copyrighted works are not given protection as derivative works.77  In 
interpreting the word “unlawfully” from Section 103, the Seventh Circuit 
has noted that “[it] means only . . . that the right to make a derivative work 
does not authorize the maker to incorporate into it materials that infringe 
                                                
74 See id. at §103(a) (“[P]rotection for a work employing pre-existing material in which 
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has 
been used unlawfully.”); see also id. at § 106(2); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 
300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[E]ven if [Defendant’s] painting and drawings had enough 
originality to be copyrightable as derivative works she could not copyright them unless 
she had authority to use copyrighted materials from the movie. ‘[P]rotection for a work 
employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of 
the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.’”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
103(a)).  
 
75 See Seeley, supra note 16, at 187 (“Accordingly, due to the student’s lack of creativity, 
there is not enough originality to assert that the lecture is significantly different from the 
class notes . . . .”).  
 
76 See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 302. 
 
77 17 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 106(2).  
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someone else’s copyright.” 78   That is to say, one party cannot use 
another’s copyrighted material without a “right to obtain [it].”79  This rule 
does not translate well in the context of class notes, however.  
 
[25] In the classroom, a professor is presumably well aware of the fact 
that his or her students are taking notes. Indeed, the value of any 
classroom experience is the conveyance of information from teacher to 
student and the retention of that information over time.80  Since the 
classroom environment is not often visited in U.S. copyright law, 
however, it is unclear whether taking notes is sufficient to constitute 
implicit “permission” for the creation of a derivative work, despite the 
implicit permission that seems to flow from this activity.81  Such an 
inference would depend, in part, on both (1) the professor’s own 
understanding of the students’ right to the lecture material and the extent 
to which that understanding is communicated to the students, and (2) if 
one exists, the school’s policy on the matter.82 
                                                
78 Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2000).  
 
79 Id. 
 
80 See, e.g., The Collegiate University: Building Exceptional Faculty-Student 
Engagement, WAKE FOREST U. (Dec. 8, 2008), strategicplan.wfu.edu/whitepaper.html  
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 
81 It should be noted that a lawsuit would be highly unlikely if the copyright holder were 
to provide the student with explicit permission to create a derivative work. 
 
82 Some schools have set explicit policies proclaiming that students do not have a 
copyright interest in the notes that those students take during class.  See, e.g., COURSE 
NOTE-TAKING AND MATERIALS, POLICY STATEMENT, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY (Dec. 5, 
2011), available at http://campuspol.chance.berkeley.edu/policies/coursenotes.pdf 
(noting that instructors retain the right to prohibit students from taking notes in class and, 
further, stating that “[e]xcept as approved in advance by the instructor, students may not 
more broadly share their notes or other Class Materials. Furthermore, except as 
authorized . . . students may not reproduce, share, or distribute notes or other Class 
Materials made available by an instructor for commercial purposes or 
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[26] When determining the likelihood that a student’s class notes might 
constitute a derivative work, the second question that a court must ask is 
whether the student’s notes are sufficiently original.83  Although the Feist 
Court stated that “[t]he standard for originality is low,”84 some courts have 
applied a slightly higher standard to derivative works.85  In Entertainment 
Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc. (“ERG”), the Ninth 
Circuit employed a test which required derivative works to exhibit a level 
of originality that: (1) is more than trivial, and (2) “reflect[s] the degree to 
which [the work] relies on preexisting material” unrelated to the scope of 
“any copyright protection in that preexisting material.” 86   The court 
explained that the second prong is meant to ensure copyright protection is 
not given to derivative works which are “virtually identical” to the original 
work.87  Applying that test, the court held that three-dimensional inflatable 
                                                                                                                     
compensation”).  This is discussed in more detail in the Preemption and Analysis 
sections, infra Parts III & IV.  
 
83 See Pickett, 207 F.3d at 405 (“[O]riginality is required for a derivative work.”). 
 
84 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (“[O]riginality is 
not a stringent standard; it does not require that facts be presented in an innovative or 
surprising way.”).  
 
85  Compare Picket, 207 F.3d at 405 (expressing disbelief that the “requisite incremental 
originality . . . slight as it need be” could not be shown), and Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 
(“Original . . . means only that the work was independently created by the author . . . and 
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. . . . [T]he requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low”), with Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 
F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]o support a copyright the original aspects of a 
derivative work must be more than trivial.  Second, the original aspects of a derivative 
work must reflect the degree to which it relies on preexisting material and must not in any 
way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that preexisting material.”) (citing 
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 523 
U.S. 1021 (1998) [hereinafter ERG]. 
 
86 ERG, 122 F.3d at 1220. 
 
87 Id. 
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costumes, which are based on copyrighted, two-dimensional cartoon 
designs,88 are not sufficiently different from the cartoons to survive the 
second prong, despite the complexities that come with creating a three-
dimensional object out of a two-dimensional drawing.89 
 
[27] The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in ERG, focusing on the way in 
which a derivative work is created, can be applied in this factual scenario 
as well.  If a student is selling her notes (or an outline based on those 
notes) through an organization like Notehall.com, the issue of whether that 
student has a copyright in her notes (or her outline) will depend on the 
extent to which the student has “recast, transformed, or adapted” the 
professor’s lecture in a way that is both (1) more than trivial, and (2) not 
virtually identical to the professor’s work.90  Much of this determination 
turns on the particular facts in any one case.  For instance, if the student 
takes the time and effort to substantially alter the way in which the 
information from her lecture is presented, then the new, altered form 
would be more likely to garner its own copyright protection.  Such a 
possibility is discussed in more detail infra Part V.  
 
III.  STATE LAW & FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
 
[28] Much of this article is premised on the idea that a professor’s class 
lecture must meet Section 101’s standard for fixation in order to be 
protected under the Act.  In certain instances, however, it is possible for an 
                                                
88 Id. at 1214 n.2 (“For example, Pillsbury purchased ‘Pillsbury Doughboy’ costumes, 
Toys ‘R’ Us purchased ‘Geoffrey the Giraffe’ costumes, and Quaker Oats purchased 
‘Cap’n Crunch’ costumes.”).  
 
89 Id. at 1224 (noting that “granting [the plaintiff costume designer] a copyright in its 
costumes would have the practical effect of providing ERG with a de facto monopoly on 
all inflatable costumes depicting the copyrighted characters”).  
 
90 See 17 U.S.C. §101 (2006); ERG, 122 F.3d at 1220. 
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“unfixed” class lecture be protected from copyright infringement under the 
laws of the several states.  
 
[29] Section 301 of the Act provides that “all legal or equitable 
rights . . . in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression . . . are governed exclusively by this title.”91  That is to say, 
federal copyright law preempts all copyright laws concerning works that 
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.  Thus, no state law that 
attempts to create copyright protection for such works will be 
valid.  However, the Act carves out an exception for those works of 
authorship that “do[] not come within the subject matter of copyright as 
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression.”92  Therefore, a state law providing 
copyright protection for “non-fixed” or unfixed works of authorship would 
not be preempted by the Act, despite the fact that the law would have to do 
with the subject matter of copyrights.93 
 
A.  California Civil Code §§ 980-89 
 
[30] As of this writing, only California has taken advantage of the 
“fixity exception” to the Act.94  In California Civil Code Section 980 
                                                
91 Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)) 
(emphasis added). 
 
92 Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1)) 
(emphasis added). 
 
93 See Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting 
that a California state law, which provides copyright protection for unfixed works, “steers 
clear of any legal or equitable rights created under federal law, and thereby avoids federal 
preemption under [the Act]”). 
 
94 STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: WHAT EVERY WRITER NEEDS TO 
KNOW 112 (Ilona Bray ed., 11th ed. 2011) (“California has a law that broadly recognizes 
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(“Section 980”), the California State Legislature mandates that “[t]he 
author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression has an exclusive ownership in the representation or 
expression thereof.”95  Thus, in California—unlike anywhere else—lack of 
fixation is not a bar to copyright protection.  
 
[31] The California Court of Appeals addressed Section 980 briefly in 
1969—before the implementation of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976—in 
Williams v. Weisser, where it considered a set of facts somewhat reflective 
of those described here in Part I.96  In that case, the defendant-company 
(“the Company”) published and sold notes from the plaintiff-professor’s 
(“the Professor”) course in Anthropology at the University of California at 
Los Angeles.97  The Company paid one of the Professor’s students to 
attend the Professor’s class, take notes based on his lectures, type up those 
notes, and deliver them to the Company for publication and sale.98  After 
the California Superior Court granted the Professor’s motion to enjoin the 
Company’s actions on the grounds that its actions were prohibited, inter 
alia, for violating the Professor’s “common law copyright in his lectures,” 
the case went before the California Court of Appeals.99 
 
                                                                                                                     
rights in unfixed original works of authorship[, while o]ther states don’t have such laws 
. . . .”) (citation omitted).  
 
95 CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (West 2012).  
 
96 Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 543 (Ct. App. 1969).  
 
97 Id.  
 
98 Id. 
 
99 Id. 
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[32] Given the Professor’s reliance on “common law copyright,”100 the 
court focused its analysis primarily on whether the Professor or the 
university owned the copyright in his lecture.  In addition, the court asked 
whether the professor had a right to preclude the defendant from 
distributing the notes resulting from that lecture, on privacy grounds.101  
The court first determined that the professor owned the copyright in his 
lecture.102  Second, on the privacy issue, the court found that the Professor 
                                                
100 At that time, state copyright law—if any—governed protection for unpublished works 
unless those works had been specifically registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.  See 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BASICS 6 (2012), available at 
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf (“Under the law in effect before 1978, copyright was 
secured either on the date a work was published with a copyright notice or on the date of 
registration if the work was registered in unpublished form.”). 
 
101 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.  
 
102 Id. at 545-50.  Although the court could not address the statutory causes of action 
available under the Copyright Act of 1976, which did not exist at that time, its holding is 
consistent with the still generally accepted exception to the “Works Made for Hire” 
section of the Act.  The Act defines a “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  The 
copyright in such works is generally considered to reside with the employer, here the 
University.  Id. at § 201(b).  However, courts have crafted an exception for professors 
because, “[a]lthough college and university teachers do academic writing as a part of 
their employment responsibilities and use their employer’s paper, copier, secretarial staff, 
and (often) computer facilities in that writing, the universal assumption and practice [is] 
that (in the absence of an explicit agreement as to who had the right to copyright) the 
right to copyright such writing belong[s] to the teacher rather than to the college or 
university.”  Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing 
the historical teacher exception and noting that “[t]he reasons for a presumption against 
finding academic writings to be work made for hire are as forceful today as they ever 
were.”) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).  But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee 
and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 599 (1987) (“The dispositive 
issue is whether production of scholarly material is ‘within the scope of employment,’ 
that is, a part of the job.  Since scholarship clearly is a factor in decisions regarding 
tenure, promotion, salary increases, sabbatical leaves, and reduced teaching loads, 
scholarly works should now belong to universities rather than to faculty members.”). 
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did in fact have a privacy interest in prohibiting the Company from 
disseminating a product that could be associated with him, especially 
given the fact that the product was not a fully accurate representation of 
the professor’s lecture.103  More importantly, for the purposes of this 
article, the court of appeals held that Section 980(a), which provides 
copyright protection for “unfixed works,” was not implicated because the 
Professor’s lecture “consist[ed] of the extensive notes which he had 
compiled before the beginning of the course . . . includ[ing] charts and 
diagrams placed on the classroom blackboard,” all of which were prepared 
before the beginning of the course.104  Thus, the court concluded, Williams 
was “not a case where the concrete expression of the ‘composition’ 
consist[ed] solely of an intangible oral presentation.”105  
 
[33] The broad, national implication that one may draw from the court’s 
determination in Williams is that there is a greater likelihood that a court 
might consider a professor’s lecture to be “fixed” when the notes 
informing it were prepared before the beginning of the semester and when 
the lecture relies on charts and diagrams to communicate to the 
students.106  Further, the inference is that, in order for Section 980 to be 
implicated, a professor’s lecture must be entirely unfixed.107  In other 
words, the lecture must be an extemporaneous presentation without notes, 
diagrams, and significant pre-semester preparation in order to qualify for 
protection under Section 980.108  
                                                
103 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51. 
 
104 Id. at 543.  
 
105 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
106 See id. 
 
107 CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (West 2012).  
 
108 Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 675 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
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B.  California Civil Code §§ 66450-52 
 
[34] Perhaps due to the fact that one could interpret Sections 980 
through 982 of the California Civil Code to protect only classroom 
lectures that are poorly prepared or un-prepared, or the fact that student 
notes could be considered uniquely original compilations or derivative 
works in their own right, the California State Legislature passed another 
amendment to the California Civil Code on August 30, 2000.109  The 
amendment, which is located in Sections 66450 through 66452 of the 
Code, provides, inter alia: 
 
(a) Except as authorized by policies developed by the 
University in accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 
66452, no business, agency, or person, including . . . an 
enrolled student, shall prepare, cause to be prepared, give, 
sell, transfer, or otherwise distribute or publish, for any 
commercial purpose, any contemporaneous recording of an 
academic presentation in a classroom or equivalent site of 
instruction by an instructor of record.110 
 
The Code further stipulates that “[t]his prohibition applies to a recording 
made in any medium,” including “handwritten or typewritten class 
notes.”111  Thus, students in California are prohibited from selling or 
                                                
109 See Charles P. Nash, On the Ownership of Academic Presentations: The Evolution of 
California Education Code Sections 66450-66452, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 205, 218 
(2004).  Nash provides a fascinating history of the proposal and eventual passing of 
sections 664050-52 of the California Civil Code, which prohibit the sale of students’ 
lecture notes, and notes that the bill was originally put forth to “curb unauthorized note 
taking in California.”  Id. at 206. 
 
110 CAL. ED. CODE § 66450 (2012).  
 
111 Id. (emphasis added).  
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publishing their class notes, regardless of copyright ownership, without 
the express permission of the university.  
 
[35] In accordance with the language of Section 66450, which allows 
for properly constructed university policies to preempt the prohibition 
forbidding the sale of class notes, many universities in California have set 
out specific policies clarifying their respective positions.112  For instance, 
the University of California at Berkeley has adopted a policy generally in 
accordance with the state’s prescriptions, proclaiming that professors own 
the copyright in their own lectures, pursuant to Section 980(a). However, 
the school asserts that students are prohibited from selling their notes 
“[e]xcept as approved in advance by the instructor . . . .”113  Additionally, 
and importantly, the University has also established a “Campus Class Note 
Subscription Service” through which notes may be sold, but only with the 
authorization of the University, the Academic Senate, and the course 
instructor.114  That utility circumvents the privacy issue discussed in 
Williams by providing instructors with the right to “review and approve 
the notes prior to their distribution and sale.”115 
 
[36] While California is the only state to have proclaimed that 
instructors have a copyright in unfixed works existing within its 
borders,116 universities in other states have set similar policies.117  For 
                                                
112 Perez, supra note 10.  
 
113 COURSE NOTE-TAKING AND MATERIALS, POLICY STATEMENT, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY, 
supra note 82, at 1.  
 
114 Id. at 2.  
 
115 Id. 
 
116 FISHMAN, supra note 94.  
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example, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC-CH”) 
has stated in its Copyright Policy: “[s]tudent [w]orks that constitute notes 
of classroom and laboratory lectures and exercises shall not be used for 
commercial purposes by the student generating such notes.”118  Of course, 
if a student were to own the copyright in her or his own notes, regardless 
of the UNC-CH policy on the matter, federal copyright laws and the 
concomitant rights of authorship that come with them would preempt any 
such prohibition.119  On the other hand, if a student were not able to meet 
the requirements of fixation and originality, then a non-California-based 
university’s policy might control.  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
[37] Though Ms. Goishi’s dilemma is a recent one, it is not an 
uncommon occurrence for students to be rebuked or punished because of 
their attempts to publish, disseminate, or sell their class notes online—as 
the Williams case shows.120  In fact, the issue was recently litigated in one 
                                                                                                                     
117 See, e.g., OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY COUNSEL, COPYRIGHT POLICY OF THE UNIVERSITY 
OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, (Jan. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/campus/policies/copyright%20policy%2000008319.pdf.  
 
118 Id. at 14. 
 
119 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006).  
 
120 See, e.g., Spencer H. Hardwick, Finalsclub.org Passes Punch, THE HARV. CRIMSON 
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2009/2/18/finalscluborg-passes-
punch-span-stylefont-weight-boldcorrection/ (discussing a “growing course preparatory 
Web site . . . which allows students to share notes, create study groups, and blog about 
lectures and sections,” reporting that one Harvard professor had forced a student to 
remove a blog concerning his course, and noting that the Harvard University Office of 
the General Counsel had determined that “a lecture is automatically copyrighted as long 
as the professor prepared some tangible expression of the content—notes, an outline, a 
script, a video, or audio recording”); see also Ryan Singel, Lawsuit Claim: Students’ 
Lecture Notes Infringe on Professor’s Copyright, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 2008/04/prof-sues-note/.  
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of the few modern-day cases addressing the narrow issue of whether a 
student or professor owns the copyright in their respective lecture notes.121  
Though the case was largely litigated in connection to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which proved to be inapplicable to 
the students’ notes, the case provides a helpful starting point for evaluating 
the viability of a copyright infringement claim relating to the 
dissemination and sale of a student’s lecture notes today.122  
 
[38] In Faulkner Press L.L.C. v. Class Notes L.L.C., the plaintiff, a 
professor123 who owned the properly registered copyrights in both his 
lecture notes and the textbooks which he authored,124 filed a copyright 
infringement suit against a note-selling company that had “hir[ed] student 
note takers as independent contractors to provide lecture summaries and 
study materials” at the university.125  The professor alleged that the 
company’s student-employees had taken notes that improperly included 
certain practice questions from his textbooks as well as other materials 
from the lecture, including an outline that the professor showed during 
class.126 
                                                
121 See Faulkner Press L.L.C. v. Class Notes L.L.C., 756 F. Supp. 2d. 1352, 1355-58 
(N.D. Fla. 2010). 
  
122 See id. at 1356, 1359. 
 
123 The professor was joined in this action by the company that published his 
textbooks.  See id. at 1355. 
 
124 These textbooks were required reading for the course.  See id. at 1361 n.1. 
 
125 Id. at 1355.  
 
126 Faulkner Press, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.  The professor also brought claims against 
the note-selling company for improperly using information in the professor’s textbooks 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. However, the Northern District of Florida 
determined that the act of taking notes during a professor’s class did not violate the Act.  
See id. at 1359-60. 
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[39] The court acknowledged that the professor’s pre-prepared practice 
questions were protected by copyright, but found that the student’s lecture 
summaries could be excepted from enforcement of the Act on grounds of 
fair use.127  Thus, the court remanded the case back to the jury to 
determine the exact nature of the notes taken.128  The court’s decision 
speaks to the heart of the issue courts outside of California must resolve 
when determining the validity of a copyright infringement claim made by 
a professor or institution against a student.  Based on the court’s 
determination in Faulkner Press, the way in which the student takes her or 
his notes may affect a court’s determination as to the notes’ ability to 
continue to be sold.   
 
[40] In the Terms & Conditions section of the Notehall.com website,  
the company states that all of its content must be “independently created, 
transformative, and non-derivative.”129  It goes on to say that a student’s 
notes: 
 
[S]hould not be a transcript or recording of another”s [sic] 
independent efforts . . . . It should go beyond simply 
summarizing material covered in class or in written or 
recorded materials, but include information raised by 
students in or outside of class, and independent thought, 
analysis and commentary.  Class notes, for example, must 
be substantially rewritten after class and include 
independent thought and analysis, research and 
information; notes that use a lecturer”s [sic] words or that 
are not carefully reviewed, rethought and rewritten after 
                                                
127 Id. at 1358-59.  
 
128 Id. at 1359.  
 
129 Chegg.com Terms of Use, NOTEHALL (last updated Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.notehall.com/index/termsofuse.  
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class are not useful to or appreciated by students, and not 
permitted on Chegg sites.130 
 
Under these terms, a student’s study guide created based on those facts 
discussed in the professor’s lecture and even a student’s class notes would 
likely meet the standard required for a work to qualify as a uniquely 
original piece of authorship that has been captured in the fixed medium of 
a student’s class notes.  Therefore, if a student is able to “transform” his or 
her work in such a way that they are no longer what they were during the 
lecture, then the student would have created his or her own original work 
of authorship.  In either case, there would likely be a factual issue, just as 
there was in Faulkner Press, as to the extent of the “transformation” of the 
student’s notes.131  
 
[41] It may also be helpful to consider the way in which a court might 
address a situation like the one described in Part I.  If a student were sued 
for copyright infringement by her professor or university, a court might 
address that case in the following way: 
 
[42] First, it is important to determine whether the professor’s lecture 
would merit copyright protection at all.  One can make that determination 
by looking at whether the lecture is fixed and, further, whether it 
constitutes an “original work.”132  It is presently unclear whether an orally 
transmitted lecture can be considered “fixed.”  However, given the court’s 
ruling in Williams, fixation may exist if the professor is able to show 
sufficient evidence that her or his lectures were well-planned before their 
delivery and that they were based on extensive notes.133  If the lecture 
                                                
130 Id. 
 
131 Faulkner Press, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1358-59. 
 
132 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 
133 See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 n.4 (Ct. App. 1969). 
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notes are not fixed, but the lecture was presented within the jurisdiction of 
California, then a copyright would exist under Section 980 of the 
California Civil Code, which provides protection for unfixed works.134  In 
addition, the sale of the class notes would be prohibited, regardless of 
fixation, under Section 66452 of the Code.135  It is unclear, however, as to 
whether a professor’s lecture would also satisfy the originality 
requirement.  Given that the requirement has been found to be generous, it 
seems likely that a student’s lecture notes would meet it, even if only as a 
compilation.136 
 
[43] The second question that a court might ask, when addressing this 
issue, is whether the professor or university owns the copyright.  Given the 
traditional exception to the “work made for hire” doctrine,137 there is a 
strong argument that a court would determine ownership in favor of the 
professor.  In either case, the court would also need to address whether the 
student’s notes are excepted from copyright liability under the fair use 
defense, weighing each of the four factors against one another.  Though it 
is perhaps unlikely, the court might determine in the alternative that the 
students had the professor’s or university’s implicit permission to create a 
derivative work from the professor’s lecture, and, thus, that the work was 
protected.  
 
[44] Third and finally—regardless of whether a professor’s lecture is 
found to be copyrightable under the Act—a court would need to determine 
whether the student had sufficiently transformed the lecture.  A court 
                                                
134 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 
135 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 
136 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The test of 
originality is concededly one with a low threshold . . . .”) (citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. 
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)). 
 
137 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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could so find on the grounds that the student work is a compilation or 
simply an original creation.138  In such an instance, the question would 
remain the same: whether the student work is fixed and, further, whether it 
is original.139  While the fixation requirement would likely be met with 
little effort—since class notes meant for transference and sale are 
necessarily fixed in a medium—it is unclear whether the student’s work 
would be considered sufficiently original.  Again, this would likely turn on 
the particular factual circumstances surrounding any one case.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[45] As a student in California, Ms. Goishi likely has little legal 
recourse.140  By passing sections 980 and 66450, the California legislature 
has made it exceedingly difficult for students to use their class notes for 
anything other than studying without the permission of the professor or 
university.141  Still, Ms. Goishi’s particular situation is not the only case of 
a student attempting to sell her professor’s lecture notes in the several 
states. Thus, it is important to address the legality of doing so outside of 
California as well.  
 
[46] If Ms. Goishi were a student outside of California, it seems that the 
copyrightable nature of her lecture notes would largely depend on the 
quality of those notes and the extent to which they were revised after 
class.  In particular, the study guide that Ms. Goishi created may be more 
                                                
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b); Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 342, 355-59 
(1991) (discussing the requirements for a compilation that is copyrightable). 
 
139 Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (stating that fixation and originality are the two fundamental 
requirements for a copyright). 
 
140 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66450 (West 2012). 
 
141 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66450(a) 
(prohibiting the use of handwritten class notes for any commercial purpose). 
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likely to achieve protection under U.S. copyright law as an original work 
of authorship. As long as the guide constituted more than a simple pasting 
of her notes from the lecture (i.e., she thoughtfully worked to develop it as 
an original source of information), it should be considered a copyrightable 
derivative work. 
  
[47] The quote at the beginning of this article is excerpted from Justice 
Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in the 1918 Supreme Court decision 
International News Service v. Associated Press. 142   In that case, the 
Associated Press brought suit against an organization called the 
International News Service for the fraudulent obtainment of information 
that the plaintiff gathered and its use for its own news service.143  The 
majority held in favor of the plaintiff, relying on the commercial value of 
the information to that person.144  That holding prompted Justice Brandeis 
to note that, “the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths 
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas . . . [are] free as the air to common 
use” once they have been voluntarily communicated, with the exception of 
instances of “creation, invention, or discovery.”145  
 
[48] The “Brandeis Rule” should be given effect in the broader context 
of student classroom notes.  Largely speaking, a professor’s lectures are 
communicated “free as the air” without being fixed in any permanent 
form.  In addition, they often constitute transmissions of facts already 
known in particularly lucid or helpful ways by the general public, and they 
rarely “creat[e], invent[], or discover[]” in and of themselves.146  Thus, 
                                                
142 Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 
143 Id. at 231 (majority opinion). 
 
144 Id. at 245-46.  
 
145 Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 
146 Id. 
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excepting those instances in which a professor’s lecture proves to be 
original or inventive in-and-of itself, student notes should be transmitted 
among students free as the air.  This would allow students to have greater 
access to the information that they need to succeed.  Finally, in accordance 
with the Brandeis Rule, student note-selling services like Notehall.com 
should give way to free note-selling services provided by the universities 
themselves, which would facilitate quality scholarship and sharing among 
all of the institutions’ inhabitants.147  
 
                                                
147 See, e.g., COURSE NOTE-TAKING AND MATERIALS, POLICY STATEMENT, UNIV. CAL. 
BERKELEY, supra note 82, at 2.  
 
